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DECISION FACTORS INFLUENCING STIMULANT USE AMONG FIGHTER AIRCREW
DURING COMBAT OPERATIONS
Russell K. Gore M.D.
U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory
Dayton, OH
Eric D. Hermes M.D.
Yale University Department of Psychiatry
New Haven, CT
During long combat missions in fighter aircraft, passive in-flight fatigue
countermeasures are often not feasible. As a result, stimulant medications (Go
Pills) may be used in-flight. The present study attempts to describe the
individual decision factors influencing stimulant use during combat operations.
Methods: 35 deployed F-15E aircrews participated in this study. Prior to the
deployment, interviews were conducted to identify factors influencing the inflight decision to use stimulants. Based on this qualitative information, a novel
survey instrument was developed. Results: Surveys were completed after 111
sorties. Results were summarized graphically. Conclusions: Active and
anticipated in-flight fatigue were the most common decision factors across all
groups. Leadership influence and perceived repercussions were the least
influential. Previous Go Pill experiences and in-flight performance were more
influential among sorties using stimulants (p<0.001). There were no notible
differences in decision factors across deployment experience.
During continuous operations, like those underway in the current combat theater, fatigue
represents a significant concern among military aircrews. In a recent survey, 74% of US Air
Force aircrews reported flying when drowsy enough to fall asleep (Tan, 2006). Specifically
among fighter aircrews, counteracting fatigue is a continuous challenge. During long combat
missions, fighter aircrews perform complex physical, cognitive, and emotional tasks without the
ability to use passive in-flight fatigue countermeasures. These aircrews, flying in single-piloted
tactical aircraft, cannot depend on in-flight napping, activity breaks, or increased cockpit lighting
to counteract fatigue (J. A. Caldwell et al., 2009). Often, when passive countermeasures are not
feasible, stimulant medications (Go Pills) are used to improve in-flight vigilance.
The use of stimulants is highly regulated and only authorized “after all other fatigue
management tools have been exhausted” (Murray, USAF Policy Letter, 2001). Nevertheless,
stimulant use in combat is commonplace with 60-65% of fighter and bomber aircrews reporting
stimulant use at least once during combat deployments (Emonson & Vanderbeek, 1995; Kenagy,
Bird, Webber, & Fischer, 2004). Prior to combat deployments aircrews are required to ground
test stimulant medications and attend informal training about stimulant use from the squadron
flight surgeon. The authors conducting this study served as fighter squadron flight surgeons and
frequently provided this training for combat aircrews. During these training sessions, many
aircrews deploying for the first time were noted to ask “when should I take the Go Pill during a
combat sortie?”
Many studies have investigated stimulant use in controlled research environments
(Bower & Phelan, 2003; J. Caldwell, Caldwell, JL, Darlington, KK, 2003; John A. Caldwell,
Caldwell, Smith, & Brown, 2004). However, the decision to use stimulants in these studies is
generally controlled as part of the study protocol. In combat, the individual aircrew decision to
use stimulants is based on a complex series of in-flight considerations. Military regulations do
not specify criteria for in-flight stimulant use and operational fatigue studies addressing this
question are few. One study evaluating stimulant use in fighter pilots during the initial phase of
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Operation Desert Storm reported that aircrews were instructed to use stimulants “30 min before
critical stages of flight if they felt unduly fatigued” (Emonson & Vanderbeek, 1995). Another
study of fighter pilot fatigue countermeasures recommends preflight planning of stimulant use in
order to avoid a “real-time, fatigue-impaired decision about go-pill use” (Schultz & Miller, 2004).
Given the lack of specific guidance and the variability of advice proffered in the operational
literature, the present study attempts to describe the aircrew decision to use stimulants in-flight
during combat operations.
Methods
This study sought to investigate the complex decision to use or not use stimulants during
combat operations. Approval for the project was obtained from the Wright-Site Institutional
Review Board (IRB) prior to gathering data.
Study Design
In 2006, an F-15E fighter squadron deployed to a forward operating location in
Southwest Asia. During this combat deployment, F15E crews consisting of a pilot and a weapons
systems officer (WSO) flew regular combat missions over Iraq and Afghanistan. The use of
stimulants during this deployment was authorized in accordance with USAF policy. Aircrews
were allowed to consume either five or ten milligrams (mg) of Dexedrine every four hours or 200
mg of Modafinil every eight hours. During the study period, participants were encouraged to
complete a post flight survey as frequently as possible after each combat mission. The decision
to use or not use in-flight stimulants was assessed using the novel survey instrument described
below.
Survey Instrument
Prior to the deployment, detailed interviews were conducted with six experienced F-15E
aircrew in order to develop a novel survey instrument. These interviews were conducted to refine
our understanding of the factors influencing the individual decision to use in-flight stimulants
during combat operations. Based on the qualitative information gathered, we identified 15
primary categories of influence including previous Go Pill experiences, active in-flight fatigue,
anticipated in-flight fatigue, preflight fatigue, habit patterns, personal convictions, planned sortie
profile, Go Pill availability, crewmate influence, in-flight workload, in-flight performance,
perceived repercussions, flight leadership influence, post flight medication effects and command
influence. For each category, descriptive statements were developed based on the initial aircrew
interviews. Using appropriate descriptive statements, parallel surveys were developed for sorties
using stimulants and for sorties not using stimulants. Figure 1 is an example illustrating the
questions contained in these parallel surveys. After landing, participants selected the appropriate
survey and reported on a visual analog scale the level to which each category influenced their
decision to use or not to use stimulants during the sortie.
Data Analysis
Survey responses were compared across stimulant use and aviator combat experience
using univariate measures of analysis. Results were summarized graphically based on the mean
visual analog scale response. For the purposes of this study, a “sortie” was defined as each
individual aircrew survey completed. Although some aircrews completed multiple surveys, we
included all 111 completed surveys in our analysis under the assumption of independence.
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A.
________________________________________________________________________
For the following statements, rate the extent to which each factor influenced your
decision to USE the Go-pill during this sortie.
1. In-flight Active fatigue–I felt tired/sleepy/sluggish or I was having difficulty staying
alert so I decided to take the Go-pill.
DID NOT
Influence
My decision

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

SIGNIFICANTLY
Influenced
My decision

B.
__________________________________________________________________________
For the following statements, rate the extent to which each factor influenced your
decision to NOT USE the Go-pill during this sortie.
1.

In-flight Active fatigue–I felt rested and alert so I did not need to take the Go-pill.

DID NOT
Influence
My decision

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

SIGNIFICANTLY
Influenced
My decision

________________________________________________________________________
Figure 1. Example of survey instrument questions portraying the “In-flight Active Fatigue”
category for sorties in which stimulants were used (A) and sorties in which stimulants were not
used (B).
Results
Survey Population
The survey population consisted of 35 aircrews, 17 pilots and 18 WSOs, with a mean age
of 30 ± 4 yr (range 25 to 41). There were 16 participants with previous combat experience and 19
deploying to combat for the first time. Among the 35 participants, 29 (82.9%) completed a
survey after at least one sortie and 18 participants (51.4%) completed surveys after more than one
sortie (range 2 to 14 surveys completed). Of the 111 sorties surveyed, the mean sortie duration
was 7.6 hrs (range 3.5 to 10.5) and stimulants were used during 39 of the sorties (35.1%).
Survey Results
Figure 2 summarizes the survey results compared across stimulant use displayed in the
order of influence for sorties using stimulants. The active and anticipated in-flight fatigue
categories were strong decision factors for both groups. Stimulant users report that their decision
was more influenced by previous Go Pill experiences (p<0.001) and in-flight performance
(p<0.001). Sorties not using stimulants reported more influence for the preflight fatigue category
(p=0.002). There were no other notable differences between these groups.
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Active In‐Flight Fatigue
*Previous Go Pill Experiences
*In‐Flight Performance

7.2 (2.6)

1.2 (2.2)

6.4 (3.1)

0.2 (0.9)

Anticipated In‐Flight Fatigue
*Preflight Fatigue
In‐Flight Workload
Post Flight Medication Effects
Planned Sortie Profile
Go Pill Availability
Habit Pattern
Personal Convictions
Flight Leadership Influence
Percieved Repercussions
Crewmate Influence
Command Influence

7.5 (2.9)

5.5 (3.3)

4.4 (3.6)
2.6 (2.8)
2.2 (3.1)
2.7 (3.0)
1.9 (2.9)
1.3 (2.4)
1.9 (2.8)
1.5 (2.7)
1.5 (2.7)
1.2 (1.2)
1.4 (2.3)
2.3 (3.3)
0.7 (1.8)
1.7 (2.8)
0.2 (0.9)
0.1 (0.3)
0.2 (0.8)
0.1 (0.4)
0.2 (0.8)
0.2 (1.0)
0.1 (0.8)
0.2 (1.1)

5.8 (3.1)

4.6 (3.5)

Go Pill Used (n=39)
Go Pill Not Used (n=72)

Figure 2. Mean survey responses [avg (SD)] comparing sorties using stimulants and sorties not
using stimulants. * Tests of statistical significance for univariate differences between sorties
using stimulants and not using stimulants were based on Analysis of Variance. Categories
showing significance at p<0.05 were Previous Go Pill Experiences, In-Flight Performance and
Preflight Fatigue.
Figure 3 summarizes the survey results compared across deployment experience
displayed in order of influence for aircrew with deployment experience. Again, active and
anticipated in-flight fatigue were the most influential categories for both groups. There were no
significant differences between experienced combat aviators and those deployed for the first time.
It is notable that the categories reported as the least influential across all groups were command,
flight leadership, and crewmate influence as well as perceived repercussions.
Discussion
Among fighter aircrews engaged in combat, the decision to use in-flight stimulants was
primarily influenced by preflight and in-flight fatigue as well as in-flight performance
decrements. Fighter aircrews were not preplanning stimulant use based mission type and
anticipated sortie duration (sortie profile) or personal habit patterns. These results indicate that
the decision to use stimulants was in line with the guidance prescribed by Emonson and
Vanderbeek, suggesting that aircrews use stimulants if they experience excessive in-flight fatigue
(Emonson & Vanderbeek, 1995). Although anticipated fatigue was statistically as strong as
active fatigue in this analysis, both of these factors involve an in-flight assessment of fatigue
rather than a preflight decision.
The decision to use in-flight stimulants was not influenced by aircrew experience. This
result indicates that aircrew strategies for in-flight stimulant use do not change with combat
experience. Due to the lack of formal guidance, this suggests that these strategies are either
intuitive or communicated informally to new aircrews through observation. Additionally,
aircrews appear to be satisfied with these decision priorities so they do not change with more
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experience. This study did not include a measure of aircrew performance to specifically evaluate
the benefits of different stimulant use strategies. Additional studies evaluating performance may
reveal strategies, or decision category priorities, that improve combat performance.
5.5 (3.4)

Active In‐Flight Fatigue
Anticipated In‐Flight Fatigue
Previous Go Pill Expereinces
Preflight Fatigue
In‐Flight Performance
In‐Flight Workload
Habit Pattern
Personal Convictions
Post Flight Medication Effects
Planned Sortie Profile
Go Pill Availability
Crewmate Influence
Command Influence
Flight Leadership Influence
Percieved Repurcussions

6.7 (3.2)

4.3 (3.5)
5.2 (3.4)
3.3 (3.7)
3.4 (3.7)
2.9 (3.1)
3.8 (3.5)
2.5 (3.3)
2.3 (3.7)
2.1 (3.0)
2.7 (3.1)
2.0 (3.0)
1.9 (3.0)
1.4 (2.8)
1.3 (2.4)
1.3 (2.8)
1.6 (2.5)
1.2 (2.5)
1.8 (2.8)
0.4 (1.3)
0.8 (2.2)
0.3 (1.4)
0.1 (0.7)
0.3 (1.5)
0.1 (0.6)
0.1 (0.6)
0.1 (0.6)
0.1 (0.4)
0.1 (0.6)

Experienced (n=16)
1st Deployment (n=19)

________________________________________________________________________
Figure 3. Mean survey responses [avg (SD)] comparing survey responses from aircrews with
previous combat experience and aircrews deployed to combat for the first time. Tests of
statistical significance for univariate differences were based on Analysis of Variance. No
significant differences were found.
Aircrews made the decision to use in-flight stimulants with minimal influence of
squadron leadership and minimal concern for post flight repercussions, allowing them to
prioritize other decision factors. This finding was consistent across stimulant use and combat
experience. Similarly, aircrews in other combat studies have reported minimal “pressure” to use
stimulants during long duration missions (Kenagy et al., 2004). These findings contradict media
reports suggesting that aviators are occasionally coerced into stimulant use by commanders
(Halbfinger, 2003). These findings also contradict the general perception within the fighter
community that commanders discourage stimulant use in combat. During this deployment, the
lack of leadership influence likely results from local command policies regarding stimulant use.
Specifically, stimulant use was approved in advance for the duration of the deployment, there
were no command directed limitations, and stimulant medications were readily available.
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